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Between Cause and Cure. The Mining Industry and 





The story of HIV/AIDS and the mining industry in South Africa is 
complex. It is also more controversial than that of other sectors discussed 
in this volume. Two interrelated factors account for the particularity of the 
case. Firstly, mining companies have contributed significantly to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS through the use of their 120 year-old migrant labor 
model. At the 2010 HIV/AIDS conference in Durban, the South African 
gold mining sector came under heavy criticism from medical 
practitioners, ex-miners, advocacy groups and the South African Minister 
of Health for its part in the tuberculosis crisis that affects the industry and 
its workforce. An activist with the Aids and Rights Alliance for Southern 
Africa referred to the industry as “TB factory”1. The health minister, Mr. 
Motsoaledi, stated that “[if] TB/HIV is a snake in Southern Africa, we 
know that its head is in South Africa in the mines. We are exporting TB 
and HIV throughout the region”.2 Secondly, the mining industry was early 
in identifying HIV/AIDS as a key risk to its operations. Already in the 
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mid-1980’s initial responses were developed. However, the overall 
exclusionary nature of these first approaches laid the ground for some of 
the difficulties in the implementation of comprehensive prevention and 
treatment policies later on. The analysis of the mining sector provides 
important insights into the specific political and normative conditions 
under which companies have historically addressed a problem such as 
HIV/AIDS in a way that contributes to improved collective goods 
provision.  
Apart from the transport sector (30 per cent), the mining industry has the 
highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS among its workforce (23-28 per 
cent) (Vass 2003, automotive only 4-9 per cent). In addition, the mining 
industry has seen a rise of opportunistic diseases such as TB and malaria. 
This high prevalence rate can be attributed to the labor-intensive model of 
mining in South Africa based on cheap, unskilled migrant labor. 
Moreover, the mining industry was a central actor in the process of 
institutionalizing racist segregation in South Africa. Since the opening of 
the first mines in 1886 the industry was based on a racial model of 
migrant labor (Murray 1982, Lipton 1985). Africans from all over 
Southern Africa were brought to the mines and housed in single-sex 
hostels while their families had to stay in their home regions. The 
Chamber of Mines (CoM) played a key role in introducing and 
maintaining the migrant and compound system. It benefited from 
governments that backed racial segregation in society and facilitated 
recruitment of labor from neighboring countries at extremely low costs 
(Terreblanche 2003: 65-78). This system became an important facilitator 
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for the spread of HIV/AIDS among mine workers. Thus, contrary to other 
sectors discussed in this volume, HIV/AIDS is not only a context factor 
South African mining companies, due to their labor intensive business 
model that heavily depends on migrant labor, have to deal with. The 
exceptionally high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS among mine workers is a 
negative externality of the South African mining industry.  
The mining industry in South Africa was the first to become aware of 
and act upon the risk of HIV/AIDS perceiving it as a threat to productivity 
and profitability as early as the mid-1980s. In 1986-7, the Chamber of 
Mines conducted a survey among 60 000 mine workers. The survey 
revealed that 0.3 to 4 per cent of mine workers had contracted HIV/AIDS, 
with the highest rate among Malawian migrant workers (Rajak 2010: 554, 
Dickinson 2004). The response taken by companies was, however, very 
restrictive. Constructing HIV/AIDS as an external and extraneous 
problem, companies sought to insulate themselves from the threat. For 
this purpose, the firms introduced pre-employment testing despite harsh 
critique from the unions (Crew 1992, Dickinson 2004). The Chamber of 
Mines stated that “[N]o known carriers will be engaged [and] and all 
recruits from high-risk areas will be tested at source” (Brink and Clausen 
1987: 15). A medical practitioner working with Anglo American explains 
that: “[b]efore the advent of the ART roll-out ... they [the companies] 
were only interested in the negative ones and how to keep them negative, 
and if you were positive you were stuffed”.3  
This position changed, however. The National Union of Mine Workers 
(NUM) continued to harshly criticize and fight against the companies’ 
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policy to send HIV-positive workers home. While mining companies had 
initially supported the insulation and repatriation approach of the National 
Party government,4 the changed political climate after 1989 and the new 
value given to human rights seemed to change the industry’s stance 
towards the pandemic. It recognized that the spread of the disease was 
caused by social and economic factors for which the mining industry bore 
responsibility (Fourie 2006: 81-84).5 Consequently, NUM and the 
Chamber of Mines negotiated comprehensive workplace HIV/AIDS 
policies (Hermanus 1993). 
Although the stage was set for a radical policy shift towards a ground-
breaking and comprehensive strategy against the pandemic, the initial 
response to HIV/AIDS developed very slowly both within government 
and in much of the private sector (Nattrass 2007: 39, Ellis and Terwin 
2004, and chapter x in this book). This changed in 2002. During the 1990s 
the number and impact of HIV/AIDS infections rose dramatically. The 
mining industry increasingly felt the impact of the pandemic. Prevalence 
rates in the mining sector currently range from 16,5 per cent up to 30 per 
cent.6 At the same time, the implementation of the government’s 
HIV/AIDS policy was slow and ineffective. The government under Thabo 
Mbeki, who took office in 1999, lacked the willingness to engage in a 
comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy including ART treatment. Since 1995 
(Labour Relations Act) and 1998 (Employment Equity Act and Medical 
Schemes Act) respectively, labor regulation in the new South Africa 
prohibits firms to dismiss HIV/AIDS positive workers or to reduce 
benefits for infected workers after early retirement. These regulations 
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caused a sharp rise in the companies’ HIV related expenditures. Thus, in 
2002, the largest private sector employer in South Africa, Anglo 
American, decided to take action and extended its HIV/AIDS program to 
include treatment as well. Other large mining firms, such as De Beers, 
Anglogold Ashanti or BHP, followed suit. 
In the following, I analyze the activities of mining companies in South 
Africa to combat HIV/AIDS post-2003 and will discuss the quality and 
inclusiveness of corporate governance contributions in this field. This is 
followed by a discussion of the factors behind mining companies’ more or 
less inclusive contributions to the collective governance of HIV/AIDS.  
 
From Exclusion to Treatment. Mining Companies‘ Responses to 
HIV/AIDS (2003-Today) 
Mining companies in South Africa were not only the first business actors 
to become aware of HIV/AIDS and act upon it. The scope of their 
engagement has also been unmatched. With the exception of the 
automotive industry, companies in other business sectors tend to focus 
less on the development of HIV/AIDS policies and their overall 
performance in the fight against the disease is comparatively weak (for the 
textile and food and beverage industries see Müller-Debus and Kranz in 
this volume). Medical practitioners and health personnel employed in the 
mining sector have also been far ahead of the government in devising and 
implementing appropriate policies to tackle HIV/AIDS.7 However, the 
reach of such private treatment programs is contested. Two aspects are 
important with respect to this debate. The first one concerns coverage: 
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Are the HIV/AIDS workplace programs of mining firms restricted to 
regular employees or do they also include contract workers, partners, 
extended families and community members in the labor sending areas? 
The second concern is the variation in the engagement of small versus 
large firms. It was mostly large scale and medium-sized companies that 
had developed HIV/AIDS policies in 2003 (Ellis and Terwin 2004). 
Larger mining companies have engaged at various levels and with various 
actors in combating HIV/AIDS. Firstly, most of these activities are 
situated at the workplace and reach beyond the workforce only to a 
limited degree. The important role of the trade union NUM is remarkable 
as is the degree to which the workplace programs within the sector are 
coordinated through the Chamber of Mines. With the evolution of 
corporate HIV/AIDS policies, mining companies have increasingly 
contracted and partnered with (I)NGOs in order to implement newly 
developed policies at the local level. Furthermore, mining companies have 
linked up with IOs, INGOs, global business associations and initiatives, as 
well as research institutions to develop policies and implement projects. 
Relations with the Mbeki government have been difficult, however. 
Therefore, secondly, not much exchange, capacity-building or 
partnerships had been taking place between companies and government at 
the national level until 2006/7, despite the lack of health service provision 
in the affected areas. In the platinum mining area of Rustenburg, in which 
HIV prevalence rates among mine workers are among the highest in the 
country (28 per cent), it was not until the end of 2005 that each district 
had its own hospital (Thornton 2008: 186). Although they refrained from 
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cooperating with national government, companies informally engaged 
with local governments. This changed, however, in 2006 when AIDS 
denialism within national government had become less acceptable and 
leadership changed in the ministry of health. National government started 
to call upon mining companies to help with their expertise and capacities 
in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Firms have also entered into more and 
more formal partnerships with governments from the municipal to the 
provincial level in order to coordinate public and private HIV/AIDS 
programs and to extend coverage. Thirdly, mining companies have not 
been very active – at least not explicitly – in influencing the government’s 
policy agenda or capacity building to improve the implementation of state 
programs.  
 
Companies’ In-House Policies 
As outlined above, the workforce in the mining industry is by far the most 
heavily affected from the HIV/AIDS pandemic compared to other 
industry sectors discussed in this volume. The widespread HIV/AIDS 
prevalence among mine workers is historically rooted in the mode of labor 
recruitment and in the industry’s labor relations more generally. Mining 
companies in South Africa address HIV/AIDS mostly at the local level of 
the workplace and in the areas from which they source their workforce.8 
Agreements between organized mine labor, most importantly between the 
largest South African trade union, the National Union of Mine Workers, 
and the Chamber of Mines, helped to facilitate the formulation and 
implementation of such policies. A first agreement between the Chamber 
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and NUM was reached in 1991 when the fundamental principles of 
HIV/AIDS workplace programs in the new South Africa were defined. 
These principles prohibited mandatory testing, prescribed confidentiality 
of testing results, and committed companies to train staff for peer 
education and to provide benefits for sick employees. A united effort 
against HIV/AIDS was called for.9  
As Brian Brink, chief medical officer at Anglo American, recounts, by 
the year 2000 investors started to see the mining industry in South Africa 
as ‘a business that’s not going to survive’ and asked ‘[s]hould we be 
looking elsewhere?’10 Therefore, mining companies launched an 
offensive and turned to a more holistic approach – as long demanded by 
the trade unions. While education and awareness programs had been 
introduced as early as 1988/9, ART treatment for workers was only rolled 
out by large-scale companies from 2002 onwards. Individual companies 
signed agreements over comprehensive HIV/AIDS workplace policies 
(prevention and treatment) between 2002 and 2003 which since then have 
provided for internal HIV/AIDS policies and have been repeatedly 
updated and renegotiated.11 By 2003, 77 per cent of the mines had an 
HIV/AIDS policy in place (as opposed to only 50 per cent of the 
manufacturers). However, only 21 per cent contained ART treatment 
(Ellis and Terwin 2004: 22-24). In 2005, Anglo American was described 
as the ‘largest single business customer for AIDS drugs in the world’ 
(Knight 2005: 22). Today it has about 11 000 HIV-positive employees 
enrolled on its HIV disease-management program in South Africa.12 
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Workplace programs target workers and their families to various extents. 
Some of these programs reach beyond the workplace to surrounding and 
sourcing communities. Workplace programs include information and 
education, counseling and voluntary testing, and intend a general 
improvement of health care provisions. Since the 2000s, treatment has 
been increasingly included in workplace schemes, though to various 
degrees. Finally, company-provided home-based care services for sick or 
retired workers have progressively begun to engage with the 
consequences of HIV/AIDS. Workplace programs are run by the 
companies themselves or in cooperation with contractors, such as for 
profit service providers and NGOs. Anglo Platinum, for instance, works 
with the NGO Vision of the Nation and Tshupe Hospice which run home-
based care centers in local communities next to the firm’s mining 
operations.13 The independent disease management company Lifeworks 
trains peer educators for BHP. Peer educators are supposed to encourage 
workers to receive counseling and go for testing  (BHP Billiton 2010, 
Knight 2005: 30). Home-based care programs in the communities from 
which employees originate are mostly run by the traditional, industry-
owned service provider TEBA. Founded in 1902, TEBA is the labor 
recruitment and management agency of the South African mining 
industry. Between 2001 and 2002, members of the CoM signed 
agreements with TEBA to provide home-based care to mine workers who 
have returned sick to the rural areas within South Africa.14  
There is variation in the inclusiveness and scope of these programs with 
regard to different time periods and different companies. In most cases 
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only full employees were initially covered by workplace programs. Over 
time, more and more companies developed broader health care facilities 
for families and communities from which they source labor as well as for 
contract labor. Part of this engagement is required by the Mining Charter 
(2002) and is fixed in a 2003 agreement between the Chamber and NUM 
on health care arrangements for dependents.15 However, when it comes to 
discussing the scope and inclusiveness of private health governance in the 
field of HIV, the most critical issue is access to treatment. Whereas most 
companies pursue a more exclusive approach, diamond mining company 
De Beers started the first treatment program that reached beyond the 
workplace in 2002. It covers workers and their families and is quite 
unique in terms of its inclusiveness as compared to other companies in the 
sector (Rispel et al. 2010: 394, Peterson and Shaw 2006). By contrast, 
BHP Billiton’s workplace program is focused on the prevention of HIV 
among its workforce only, but does not provide ART treatment. The 
company supports workers to get access to private medical schemes that 
include HIV/AIDS treatment (Knight 2005, BHP Billiton 2008: 60). 
However, as opposed to gold mining companies, BHP changed its 
recruitment practices from migrant labor to sourcing labor from local 
communities in order to address one of the root causes of the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.16 In 2002, Goldfields provided treatment to employees only in 
exceptional cases such as for rape victims and to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission.17 One of the big debates in the mining sector in recent years 
has been about the issue that the mining companies and the trade unions 
 11 
do not address the needs of extended family members and the broader 
communities that depend on mining.18  
Companies rarely extend their contributions to combating HIV/AIDS to 
the district or provincial level. Where this is the case it is a fairly recent 
phenomenon, partly triggered by a change in the government position 
allowing for more public-private cooperation and therewith the extension 
of business efforts beyond a narrow focus on the workplace to the 
‘community belt’ (Hönke 2012a) and beyond. De Beers was the first 
company to extend HIV/AIDS services to host communities.19 Others, 
such as Anglo American, followed suit.20 Another problem mining 
companies hesitate to deal with is to address the root causes of widespread 
HIV/AIDS prevalence in mining areas, the migrant labor system. Only 
BHP changed recruitment practices by privileging local over migrant 
labor. While all mining companies are required by the MPRDA and the 
Mining Charta to phase out single sex hostels and transform them into 
family units, BHP has been especially responsive and relocated mine 
hospitals to the neighboring communities (Knight 2005: 30-31).  
At the global level, the South African Chamber of Mines and its prime 
stakeholders – large multinational companies including Anglo American, 
BHP, Anglogold Ashanti, Goldfields and De Beers – exchange best 
practices and develop voluntary best practice standards. Furthermore, they 
engage in corporate social investments in HIV/AIDS projects. Regarding 
the former, companies have supported the development of a Best Practice 
AIDS Standard through membership in the Global Coalition on 
HIV/AIDS. Concerning corporate philanthropy, companies contribute 
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financially to various health care, VCT and treatment projects of the 
Global Coalition on HIV/AIDS. In addition, the mining industry has a 
sector-specific business association that is specialized in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and sustainability issues and operates at the global 
level. Through the International Chamber of Mines and Metals (ICMM), 
companies support trials for a new therapeutic vaccine for HIV/AIDS.21 
 
Precarious Cooperation: Collective Goods Provision with Government 
Cooperation between public authorities and companies in addressing 
HIV/AIDS has been scarce and limited to prevention and to 
implementation issues at the local level. Mining companies send medical 
practitioners to serve in public hospitals on an occasional basis, or the 
general public is allowed to access mining hospitals at times. Some 
hospitals are run as public-private partnership, increasingly so since 2006. 
As long as the government opposed ART, companies with ART programs 
had to act very carefully. While the government was careful not to 
officially endorse such programs, it allowed companies to pursue private 
ART initiatives. Before 2006, only some companies engaged in 
partnerships with local governments in order to prevent HIV/AIDS or 
provide related health services in selected localities. As long as president 
Mbeki and his health minister Tshabalala-Msimang opposed ART 
treatment, cooperation in this area was difficult, risky and thus unlikely. 
Instead, companies contributed to awareness-raising campaigns, as for 
instance Harmony Gold in the Morobe district (Harmony Gold 2006: 46). 
Anglo Platinum initiated a comprehensive community care program with 
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the title Circle of Hope in 2002. Circle of Hope seeks to minimize the 
impact of HIV/AIDS in Anglo Platinum’s neighboring communities. 
Since the start of the program, the company has emphasized their aim to 
collaborate with local and district government, NGOs, health practitioners 
and traditional healers (Anglo American 2005: 89). While the program’s 
initial focus was on care and peer education in a 50 km circle around its 
operations in the Rustenburg area, it was soon extended to provide home-
based care for returned workers in the labor sending areas of the Eastern 
Cape (ibid). 
With changing power relations in 2006 and a subsequent shift in 
government towards a pro-ART treatment stance, increased cooperation 
has become possible. Usually, cooperation still takes place at the level of 
the municipality or district. As a company manager explains ‘...there is 
much more like meeting sessions and all that with the government than 
action. [...] we rather target local government, you know. Because things 
tend to move faster in terms of action and implementation [...] Anyways, 
the national government will at the end of the day do whatever they want 
to do’.22 It was only in 2010 that Anglo extended its HIV policies beyond 
employees and dependents in a more comprehensive manner. Working 
with the Eastern Cape Department of Health, it supports the provincial 
administration to improve health service provision in four selected 
districts (Anglo American 2010: 21; see also the section on public private 
cooperation below). 
Mining companies have increased their engagement for education and 
overall health care services (prevention/care) in neighboring communities 
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and labor sending areas. However, the limited inclusiveness of the mining 
sector’s contributions to local HIV/AIDS governance is particularly 
evident with regard to the companies’ stance on informal settlements that 
are characteristic for the mining regions, such as the booming platinum 
mines in North-Western Province and Limpopo. Although many mine 
workers live in these settlements, the mines continue to refuse 
responsibility and ask local government to provide for services (Hamann 
2008).  
At the global level, the Chamber has participated in tripartite negotiation 
between labor and labor organizations, the labor ministries of 
governments and other employer organizations to develop the ILO Code 
of Practice on HIV/AIDS.23 
 
Impact on State Policies and Implementation  
Confronted with excessive rates of infection among its workforce and a 
particularly strong trade union movement, the large mining companies 
have long exceeded government in terms of know-how, strategies and the 
provision of resources for the prevention and, in particular, the treatment 
of HIV/AIDS. Due to negative experiences with the national government, 
however, they have rarely approached the government to foster public 
policies. The mining industry claims to have been involved in the 
formulation of the first South African HIV/AIDS policy under the 
Mandela government in 1994 as well as in the development of a 
comprehensive national HIV/AIDS policy in 2003.24 A tripartite forum on 
HIV/AIDS was established at NEDLAC in 2002/03, and together with 
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government and labor, an HIV and AIDS Summit was held in 2003 at 
which the three parties signed a declaration. However, both strategies 
were slow and not successful in their implementation. Despite such formal 
interaction and involvement, it seems that HIV/AIDS was such an 
excessively politicized issue that national government opted for the delay 
or blockage of action. Relations between those companies that began 
contemplating treatment and the Mbeki government, which was against 
such treatment, were strained in what regards HIV/AIDS policies. As a 
consequence, the HIV Council was blocked for several years. When asked 
about their interactions with government on HIV/AIDS issues, 
interviewees stated that if anybody was interested in their expertise, they 
would not be opposed to sharing their knowledge. However, these 
representatives of mining firms are skeptical about working with the 
national government in general.25 While companies frequently exchange 
expertise and strategies on their HIV/AIDS policies in the context of the 
Chamber of Mines, these private sector efforts to approach the problem at 
the workplace have rarely been communicated and coordinated with 
public policies. Instead of involving the state, a parallel system of 
providing health services at the company level, including the pooling of 
resources with others, has developed. 
There are two main reasons for why the high degree of self-regulation 
within the industry did not translate into an active engagement with public 
HIV/AIDS policies until recently: First, a lack of political will within 
government prevented firms from collaborating with government in 
efforts against the pandemic. Slow and limited policy implementation in 
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the 1990s and Mbeki’s denial of AIDS during his presidency led to very 
limited government activity to address the problem of HIV/AIDS 
appropriately. It was (only!) in 2003 that the ANC government decided in 
favor of a national HIV/AIDS treatment strategy (see chapter by Müller-
Debus and Thauer in this volume). At the same time, President Mbeki and 
Health Minister Tshabalala-Msimang warned against the ‘poisonous’ 
effects of ART and actively obstructed delivery of treatment – even after 
the launching of a public ART policy. Government reactions to Anglo 
American’s new treatment program, launched in 2002, prove insightful. 
Rajak reports how Anglo American managers never got tired of 
describing the company’s heroic ‘coming out’ with an HIV program 
against the health minister, describing how ‘she was really pissed-off’ and 
felt that the company was ‘squeezing’ her (Rajak 2010: 557, Von Soest 
and Weinel 2006, Müller-Debus 2006: 18). Anglo, at the same time, 
presented its action as a moral mission. However, there is little doubt that 
the new program was also a reaction to increased labor and health costs 
caused by the HIV pandemic (ibid.). While Anglo took action early on, 
other companies refrained from publicly opposing the President’s 
position. Formerly employed at the department of health, the health 
manager who developed BHP’s HIV/AIDS policy in 2002/3 put strong 
emphasis on VCT, yet did not include ART treatment in the company 
program.26 
Second, the ANC government meets the mining industry with suspicion 
and mistrust. Since the mining industry is responsible for the high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence among its workforce, it is expected to address the 
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problem. The change in government policy has come about without 
significant business involvement. One may argue that the decision by 
Anglo American to engage in treatment in 2002 had significant political 
ramifications. However, informants disagree on the extent to which 
Anglo’s decision directly catalyzed the national roll-out of ART to which 
the South African government committed in 2003. What can be said with 
certainty is that Anglo Americans unilateral decision was not well 
received by the minister of health and triggered serious tensions between 
government and the company, according to the accounts of several 
AngloAmerican executives (see above).  
Two developments may result in changing patterns of HIV/AIDS 
policies leading to increased cooperation between public and private 
actors. First, the ANC government adopted a new position and came up 
with a strategic plan to combat HIV/AIDS 2007-2011. As part of a change 
in leadership within the health ministry in 2006, the responsibility for 
HIV/AIDS policy was transferred from the health minister to the deputy 
president and the deputy health minister. The South African National Aids 
Council (SANAC) was restructured and conducted consultations between 
government, civil society and business about the new National HIV/AIDS 
policy. The mining industry became part of it in 2007 and CoM was 
involved in formulating the new National Strategic Plan on HIV and STIs 
2007-11.27 Moreover, president Zuma appointed Mr. Motsoaledi as the 
new health minister in 2009. Described as a respected medical practitioner 
and former provincial minister, he has fostered ties with leading 
HIV/AIDS activists and NGOs in order to change the way HIV/AIDS is 
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treated by the government in South Africa.28 Thanks to these 
developments, mining companies, local governments and public health 
practitioners increasingly partner in running hospitals and combining 
company-internal ART programs that include easier access to the public 
roll-out of treatment through medical aid schemes.29  
Second, the scope of the initial workplace-approach of many companies 
has proven too limited to effectively tackle a task as complex as the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. It has become evident that effective treatment will 
only be achieved if the extended family of mine workers is involved in 
anti-retroviral therapies. The elimination of important veto players within 
government and, at the same time, the need for more broad-based and 
complex strategies to combat HIV/AIDS might lead to more pro-active 
co-operation between private and public actors. Mining companies have 
focused on providing a comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy as a club good – 
that is to workers, to dependents (to some degree), and in some cases also 
to neighboring and sending communities. Regarding the latter, however, 
services are limited to education and prevention as well as support for 
improved general health services; but these services do not offer 
HIV/AIDS testing and treatment. Public contributions to combating 
HIV/AIDS have improved a lot but are still limited by a lack of resources 
and other capacities.30  
 
Mining Companies Against HIV/AIDS – When and How Inclusive 
Assessments of the role of mining companies in combating HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa are split into two camps: those who highlight the 
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achievements of private efforts against the pandemic and see the 
companies’ engagement as a reflection of their ethical stance; and those 
who criticize these efforts as insufficient and as a mere publicity tool as 
they point to the legacy and responsibility of the industry for the 
pandemic (Rajak 2010). Speaking to companies and reading their 
individual or business association reports, we are presented with the first 
narrative, which highlights the business case for HIV/AIDS. In difference 
to the automotive industry, however, the business case in the mining 
industry is not attributable to asset specificity – high investments in rare 
skills of employees (Thauer 2012). Compared to the automotive sector, 
the mining industry does not qualify as a high-skills industry. Instead, 
HIV bears heavily on the productivity and costs of mining operations on 
account of the sheer size of the problems caused by the disease. We must 
remember that the prevalence rates in this industry are much higher than 
in any of the other industry sectors analyzed in this volume. At the same 
time, the public sector is unwilling or unable to combat the disease. The 
government’s inactivity to render health services can be interpreted as a 
shadow of anarchy under which mining companies decided to address 
HIV/AIDS with their own means. 
The companies’ decision for this was also based on the calculation of the 
cost incurred by HIV/AIDS without a workplace policy: BHP estimates 
that for every dollar invested in training, education and medical programs, 
the return was fourfold in terms of benefits like retraining, absenteeism 
and productivity.31 Goldfield claims it lost about 5$ per ounce of gold 
produced in South Africa as a result of HIV. The medical consultant with 
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Anglo, Brian Brink, and Anglo’s current chief medical officer, Jan 
Pienaar, report that without a treatment program HIV/AIDS would cost 
the company 5 per cent of its payroll (Brink and Pienaar 2007: 79). In the 
later stages of the infection, workers lose up to 15 workdays a month. 
When they leave work or die in the mines, companies have to pay 
sickness benefits or pensions to their families, as Brian Brink of Anglo 
explains.32 Preventive HIV/AIDS policies and treatment are also financed 
by companies because this promises to be more cost-effective compared 
to the overall costs non-action would cause (see for instance Rosen et al. 
2003).  
Another aspect of the first, positive, narrative is that this business case 
for HIV/AIDS is presented as a moral mission of companies who would 
fight the pandemic against all odds, such as irresponsible or weak 
government. It serves to increase the companies’ reputation and improve 
their public image (see Rajak 2010: 552-3). Critical voices emphasize 
instead the exploitative practices of the industry, which are related to the 
labor recruitment model and a root cause of the exceptionally high HIV 
prevalence rates in the mining areas and in labor sending communities. 
From the critics’ point of view, companies engage in corporate social 
spending more generally and specifically in HIV/AIDS policies out of 
reputational concerns. CSR activities, it is argued, are deployed to 
disguise structural inequalities as well as current and past exploitation and 
public bads caused by the very same industry (see Marks 2006, Fig 2005). 
Either way, reputational concerns and public pressure provide also 
incentives for mining companies to engage in HIV/AIDS governance. 
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It has so far been argued that mining companies’ activities in the field of 
HIV/AIDS can be attributed to two factors. First, an appropriate state 
response to HIV/AIDS is lacking. This imposes considerable costs on 
mining companies which are faced with extremely high prevalence rates 
(shadow of anarchy). Second, mining companies engage in the struggle 
against HIV/AIDS out of reputational concerns. However, these two 
factors cannot account for the variance of responses of mining companies 
in South Africa to the HIV/AIDS pandemic at different points in time. 
The degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the companies’ 
programs differs widely over time. In the following, I will argue that a 
shadow of hierarchy cast by the post-apartheid South African state and the 
post-apartheid normative context played important roles in turning the 
companies’ response to HIV/AIDS from an exclusionary to a more 
inclusive approach. 
The post-apartheid ANC responded slowly to the pandemic and 
subsequently opposed ART treatment (see Nattrass 2007). In a meeting 
with the Mines Safety and Health section in the Department of Minerals 
and Energy in 2007, government representatives explained that they only 
started looking into the issue of HIV in 2006 and emphasized repeatedly 
that they were only starting to get active now, still figuring out the 
relationship between occupational health and HIV/AIDS.33  
However, the shadow of anarchy did not only result from a lack of state 
capacity, but also from a lack of willingness. More importantly, the 
mining companies’ contributions to the governance of HIV/AIDS only 
started in the late 1990s, even though they had felt the impact of the 
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pandemic much earlier and the government had not effectively addressed 
the issue throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Finally, companies 
developed different responses at different moments in time to address the 
challenge of HIV/AIDS under conditions of limited statehood in South 
Africa. We observe strategies of exclusion and insulation as well as the 
provision of HIV/AIDS health services. As far as the latter is concerned, 
the degree of inclusiveness can range from narrow club good to 
contributions to health as public good. In the 1980s, companies opted for 
an exclusionary approach, trying to insulate themselves from the 
pandemic instead of providing treatment. Through the use of pre-
employment testing, companies tried to prevent HIV-positive workers 
from entering the company. Employees who were unable to continue their 
work due to an HIV/AIDS infection were simply dismissed. This was 
possible because the mining industry is based on low-skilled, mass labor. 
It thus becomes clear that the shadow of anarchy is not an incentive to 
engage in inclusive governance as such; instead, cost-effective solutions 
can be exclusionary and private-good oriented.  
However, the changing normative context after the end of apartheid 
rendered such an approach impossible. While the ANC government 
remained largely inactive in the area of HIV/AIDS, new norms became 
institutionalized in the South African labor regulation, effectively 
changing the cost calculation of firms in the field of health. Even though 
companies faced a lack of state action against HIV/AIDS, they did not 
operate under a complete shadow of regulatory anarchy in this field post-
1990. Newly designed labor regulations now prohibit mandatory testing 
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and automatic dismissal due to an HIV infection. This regulation 
effectively casts a shadow of hierarchy over companies. Furthermore, 
companies are bound to guarantee the same pension and home-based care 
benefits to early retired HIV-positive workers and dependents of deceased 
workers as to everybody else. The Prescribed Minimum Benefit 
Amendment of 2005 obliges companies to include HIV testing, care and 
treatment in their medical aid schemes (Mahajan et al. 2007: 3). Finally, 
the new Mining Charta commits companies to improve the living 
conditions of mine workers, to develop integrated rural development plans 
for labor-sending areas, and to improve the standard of housing, which 
includes upgrading hostels into single accommodation and family units.34 
All of these newly established labor regulations (shadow of hierarchy) 
have increased the companies’ costs in relation to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic considerably.  
Changes in the normative context were not bound to post-apartheid 
South African law but extended to the international level throughout the 
1990s, posing a clear threat to the reputation of mining companies. By the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, mining companies in South Africa understood 
the need to improve their negative image in order to reintegrate and 
prosper in a global economy and a new South Africa. Reintegrating 
themselves as good corporate citizens into the global economy became a 
new imperative and companies increasingly committed to global norms of 
CSR. Companies had a double incentive to do so. On the one hand, major 
mining companies such as the Anglo American Group and Billiton shifted 
their primary listings to the London stock exchange in 1999 and 1997 
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respectively, subjecting themselves to new standards  (Chabane et al. 
2006: 559). On the other hand, the political position of mining companies 
in South Africa was vulnerable throughout the 1990s. Several companies 
were seen as having directly or indirectly supported the apartheid regime, 
a charge confirmed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Nattrass 
1999). In order to comply with the demands of shareholder capitalism and 
to gain legitimacy in the eyes of foreign shareholders, the South African 
government and society at large, major companies embraced the agenda 
of corporate citizenship and CSR (Hönke et al. 2008). They sought to 
change their image from collaborators and profiteers of racial segregation 
and oppression to the economic backbone of the developmental 
aspirations of the new South Africa and as socially responsible (Fig 2007, 
Hamann 2004). 
Despite the importance of reputational concerns, pressure exerted by 
NGOs seems to have played only a minor role in motivating companies to 
take action against HIV/AIDS. NGOs such as the Treatment Action 
Campaign were among the most important actors to push the South 
African government as well as pharmaceutical companies to provide for 
comprehensive and affordable HIV/AIDS treatment. They were, however, 
less relevant for pushing mining companies into action. Nevertheless, the 
National Union of Mineworkers was instrumental in shaping how mining 
companies reacted to HIV/AIDS. NUM campaigned for non-
discrimination at the workplace and convinced companies to drop 
exclusionary policies in exchange for a rights–based and inclusive 
HIV/AIDS-workplace policy. Tracy Peterson, who developed the first 
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comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy for De Beers, recounts how the draft of 
the policy was blocked by NUM until De Beers, after rounds of 
negotiations, finally agreed to include treatment in the program. The 
policy was subsequently announced in 2002.35 However, NUM’s position 
on HIV/AIDS, largely shaped by the experience of workers who lost their 
jobs or were expelled from the country, has sometimes become an 
obstacle to combating HIV/AIDS comprehensively. Protecting workers 
from having to expose their status (abolishment of mandatory testing) is 
commendable, but it becomes problematic when it helps to keep an aura 
of confidentiality and stigma around HIV (Dickinson 2009).36  
What are the other factors that explain the different degrees of 
inclusiveness and effectiveness of mining companies’ contributions to 
combating HIV/AIDS? The size and capacity of a company plays a major 
role.37 HIV/AIDS policies are expensive, in particular when it comes to 
treatment. Medium-sized South African gold miner Harmony Gold, for 
instance, only provides ART to employees and, in contrast to mining 
giants such as Anglo American or De Beers, is less engaged in mining 
communities.  
The evidence from the mining sector suggests that the willingness and 
capacity of the state may not be a precondition for companies to address 
HIV/AIDS. However, political leadership and resources effectively 
influence how inclusive and effective companies’ HIV/AIDS policies turn 
out to be. Private HIV/AIDS governance contributions are more inclusive 
if companies cooperate with local governments, as envisaged in 
partnering programs with local governments since 2007. At the same 
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time, however, state actors may also prevent private governance 
contributions. The anti-ART position of the Mbeki-government has 
clearly delayed, if not obstructed an earlier engagement of companies 
regarding treatment. This is reflected in the above mentioned negative 
reaction of the South African health minister to Anglo American’s 
initiative to provide treatment. Furthermore, De Beers reported how its 
policy got delayed by the government while other companies refrained 
from certain policies entirely in order to avoid trouble with the 
government. Relations between the government and mining companies on 
the issue of HIV/AIDS have been strained. Not only did the government 
refrain from taking national leadership for a comprehensive HIV/AIDS 
policy for so long; it was in fact a stumbling block: officials interfered 
with and delayed private treatment initiatives.38 
Finally, the effectiveness of the companies’ governance contributions is 
limited by stigma. To talk about sex openly is still a problem in South 
Africa and prevents people from testing but also from seeking treatment at 
an early stage (Dickinson 2009). Company-run programs are particularly 
hampered by a lack of confidentiality and the fear of losing the job; this, 
in consequence, results in low rates of VCT or treatment uptake (see for 
instance Bhagwanjeel et al. 2008). In addition, public statements by 
leading politicians, not only by Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang, but also 
by the current president Jacob Zuma, have contributed to a persistent 
denial of HIV and an acknowledgement of the causal nexus between 




The mining industry contributes considerably more to the governance of 
HIV/AIDS compared to the other industry sectors analyzed in this 
volume. Comparable commitment can only be found in the automotive 
sector. It is on a much higher level than in the textile, food and beverage 
industries. Medical practitioners and health managers working with some 
of the large mining companies in South Africa have been at the forefront 
of developing appropriate strategies to address the epidemic. At the same 
time, mining companies contribute to the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates 
in an important way. Thus, compared to other industry sectors, the 
normative or moral pressure on mining companies is higher since these 
companies are not only part of the cure but also part of the problem, 
namely the rapid spread of the pandemic in Southern Africa. Reduced 
profitability due to the costs caused by HIV/AIDS, and reputational costs 
on account of the companies’ responsibility for the spread of the 
pandemic are two drivers of the strong engagement of mining companies 
against HIV/AIDS. Finally, the shift in the mining companies’ response to 
HIV/AIDS – from an extremely exclusionary, insulating strategy in the 
1980s to a treatment strategy after 2002 – highlights the role of norms and 
institutions in forming the decision-making of companies as to how 
inclusive or exclusive they will react to the shadow of anarchy.  
I conclude this chapter by outlining three problems concerning mining 
companies’ contributions to the governance of HIV/AIDS and what they 
teach us about the privatization of governance more generally. Firstly, 
Rajak has recently argued that – quite opposite to the late 1980s – 
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company managers she interviewed presented the business case for 
HIV/AIDS as a moral mission and stressed that it was the responsibility of 
the companies to do something to improve the lives of all. Yet, these same 
managers externalized HIV as a social risk that comes from outside and 
threatens productivity and profit. As one of the managers Rajak spoke to 
put it there were “things in the country happening […] such as […] HIV 
[…] things which are not caused by the company […] but we are getting 
zapped by it” (cited from Rajak 2010: 557). This shows that there is still a 
tension between corporate social responsibility and externalization, 
between presenting the firm as providing a solution for a certain problem 
without acknowledging the fact that they are also a cause of it.  
Secondly, despite increased public engagement and inclusiveness of 
programs, the problem of exclusiveness remains. Companies contribute to 
the improvement of services that aim at the prevention and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS. However, due to the strong focus on workplace programs, 
inequalities in terms of access to care and treatment are deepened. 
Insulation and fragmentation seem to be problematic outcomes of 
privatized governance more generally (Hönke 2012a: 11-16). At the same 
time, there are ethical problems attached to promoting firms as paternalist 
governance providers. Companies become highly involved in regulating 
the workers’ private lives while, at the same time, they increase the 
workers’ dependency on them.  
Thirdly, there are also broader political consequences resulting from the 
pluralization of governance actors. The business and governance 
literature, and especially that on CSR, looks mainly at what Avant et al. 
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(2010: 358) refer to as ‘virtuous cycles’ of better collective goods 
provision and regulation for the public good. Others, however, have 
argued that ‘vicious cycles’ towards overlapping and competing rules and 
non-governance, degrading accountability, fragmentation and 
exclusiveness of governance will prevail empirically. Non-state actors 
may thus eventually reduce the provision of collective goods because of 
the limited scope of their mandates and activities, and because of their 
negative effects on governance by states. There is significant variation in 
what we find empirically and there is evidence supporting both 
tendencies. Thus, more systematic attention needs to be paid to the 
different degrees of inclusiveness of business governance contributions 
and their broader and longer-term effect on public goods provision, justice 
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